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I argue the utility of distinguishing between the overlapping concepts of partisanship and party identification. I do so by presenting some of the consequences of limiting the measurement of party identification to the responses evoked by the classic root question, "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?" In presenting this set of findings as a research note, I will not attempt to add to the literature on the differences between strong identifiers and weak identifiers, nor will I reexamine the many interpretations of the partisan sympathies of "independent leaners."
Even without undertaking such tasks, my mode of presenting data on the historical record of party identification, narrowly defined, calls into question at least a portion of the current conventional wisdom about the nature of party identification and about the responsiveness of party identification to economic and social events in the lives of individual voters. I shall question the conclusion that a national party realignment preceded the election of 1984. I shall also question the conclusion that dealignment has reduced the relevance of party identification for the vote choice. Finally, in pursuing these conclusions I shall question some revisionist arguments concerning the impact of short-term influences on party identification.
Party Identification and Its Operational Measure
My approach to encouraging reconsideration of some of the conventional wisdom about party identification has three major structural components. First, I employ a conceptual definition of Democrats and Republicans that rests entirely on answers to the root question, "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?" People who answer "independent" or "no preference" or "some other party" are not treated as Republicans or Democrats, even though they may subsequently admit to being closer to one of the two parties. Moreover, I will not distinguish between strong or weak partisans. Thus my basic measure is restricted to separating party identifiers (Democrats and Republicans) from nonidentifiers.
The reasons for this strict interpretation of the meaning of party identification are more firmly grounded in theory than in data. There is little question that variations in the "strength of partisanship" have reflected variations in the short-term fortunes of the respective parties, and have led to changes in the sheer intensity of partisan enthusiasms. It has also been well documented that the same short-term forces have both attracted and repelled many citizens who, while not major party identifiers, have on different occasions seen themselves to be closer to one of the two major party alternatives. However, neither of these considerations speaks directly to the question of individuals responding to the same short-term influences by self-consciously moving across the boundary separating identifiers from nonidentifiers. The question is not whether "independent leaners" may, from time to time, be more partisan in their voting or their issue preferences than are weak identifiers. And the question is not whether independent leaners are covert partisans; they are demonstrably and overtly partisan. The question is the stability (and the meaningfulness) of one's self-identification as a Democrat, a Republican, or as something else.
In searching for an answer to this question I "return to the basics" as I reconsider the original treatment of the concept and the measurement procedures reported in The American Voter (Campbell, et al. 1960, 121-28) . A return to the source places the original measurements in context. It is clear that the effort in The American Voter was to build on the concept of group (party) identification, but also to create an indicator that would differentiate among degrees of "partisanship" or "partisan coloration." With hindsight, it now seems that the effort to maximize the versatility of an operational measure blurred the clarity of the basic concept of identification with a political party. On the one hand, going beyond the root question to differentiate additional degrees of partisanship muddled the dimensionality of the resulting measure. It introduced intransitivity into a presumed continuum. Most important here, it also created indicators of partisanship that were reflective of short-term influences of preferences for issues or for candidates as well, perhaps, as variations in the relatively enduring sense of partisan political self that is the explicit heart of the concept of identification (Brody 1978; Keith et al. 1986; Miller 1991 In a related development, attention to variations on the strength dimension of partisanship had focused interest on what has come to be called dealignment. At some point in the reconsideration of party identification, the role of microlevel dealignment as a forerunner to systemic realignment must be taken up anew. Because of the limited goal of this research note I shall not present, nor follow the implications of, data connecting dealignment to realignment. It is enough to be concerned with the historical record of party alignments, e.g., the empirical record of the numerical balance between those who are self-identified Republicans and Democrats. That record will be based on the classic definition of party identification rather than on reflections of the broader construct of partisanship (Miller 1991 ).
The Historical Record
The second major structural component of my analysis is the decision to exploit the full 36-year time series array of National Election Studies presidential election study data, 1952-88. Examining the full sweep of the period covering 10 elections provides a historical context essential to the analysis of party realignment, as well as to the simple study of aggregate indicators of stability and change through time.
Subgroup Differences
The third element in my strategy of inquiry is to consider, more or less in tandem, several strands of evidence that are usually presented in isolation, one from the other, in the literature. To this end I shall "disaggregate" the electorate and examine such constituent segment in the presence of all other segments; the parts will sum to the whole, but I will be able to assess the contribution of each part to the whole.
Electoral Participation
My first disaggregation separates voters from nonvoters. I shall note that the party identifications of nonvoters among various subgroups in the electorate differ from the party identifications of voters in the same subgroups. I shall also note that combining the two often obscures patterns that characterize voters alone. This must certainly mean that analyses relating aggregate national distributions of party 
Gender
In my "return to basics," as I examine the record of party identification distributions over the past 10 elections, I shall add one more dimension, gender. Genderrelated differences usually drew comment in the 1950s to explain how widows were responsible for the slightly pro-Republican cast to the female vote of the 1950s. In more recent years, the persistent proDemocratic, presumably liberal, cast of women's votes (when compared to male votes) has been labeled "The Gender Gap." As an empirical matter, it is real. In all of the recent elections the female vote has been more Democratic than has the male vote, and this contrasts rather sharply with both the 1950s and 1960s. Our last question, therefore is: "Is there now a 'gender gap' among nonblack voters South or non-South-that constitutes an element of party realignment?" Still other dimensions of interest to both practical politics and political theory, such as religion and age, could be added to this list. However, it is not necessary to go beyond the set I have selected in order to make the point that a reassessment of the historical record of the nature and role of party identification is needed. Among the dimensions of disaggregation I have specified, the distinction between voters and nonvoters is the most important (Epstein 1985 The importance of explaining the malefemale differences among nonblack Southern voters is accentuated by the realization that those differences in the 1980s are primarily responsible for the much discussed "gender gap" for those years (Baxter and Lansing 1983; Frankovic 1982). Even without "understanding" these gender differences, it seems possible that the appearance of the gender gap in the Reagan years was not as much a function of a liberal, pro-Democratic growth in the partisan sentiments of women as a function of the sharply conservative proRepublican move among men (Wirls 1986 ). The Republicans have not had a new problem with women; the Democrats have had a continuing problem among men. And once regional data are sorted out, the specification of the gender problem is largely confined to the South.
Black Voters
Turning away from region and gender differences within white voters to consider the partisan sympathies of the black citizenry, the separation of black voters and black nonvoters from the remainder of the electorate highlights the recent contributions of black voters to partisan national elections. The apparent impact of the Kennedy-Johnson era was more dramatic among black voters than nonvoters. And, given their mobilization beginning in the mid-sixties, black voters across the nation were ultimately only slightly fewer in number than were Southern, white male voters. As a consequence, the fact that black voters across the nation almost tripled their margin of support for the Democratic party between 1960 and 1968 by itself more than offset, in sheer numbers, the 50% decline in the Democratic plurality among Southern white males.
The Table 2 , documents both episodes of declining correlation; it also documents the atypicality of the 1964 and 1972 elections.
The left hand column of 
Party Voting
The more general conclusion that there has been no across-time decrease in the extent to which the national presidential vote is a party vote is neither challenged nor further illuminated by our disaggregation of voters by gender, region, or race. Year in and year out, women have been no more likely than men to cast a party vote nor to defect and cross party lines to vote for a president. After 1960, the black vote was as unwaveringly Democratic as were black voters' partisan loyalties. And within regional comparisons, as with the others, party voting in the 1980s was every bit as common-or uncommon-as it had been in the 1950s. The record of Democratic identifiers at the polls is a persistent record of substantially less party support than given by Republicans, and it is somewhat more varied than the record of Republicans. Nevertheless, the Democratic patterns of regional party voting do not appear to have changed at all over three decades. Democrats, regardless of either region or sex, were just as faithful-or unfaithfulto party in their 1984 and 1988 votes as in earlier decades. There is no evidence pertaining to either party in either region of any difference in the level of party voting among party identifiers that would distinguish the 1980s from the 1950s.
There are real world consequences of this observation that extend well beyond what it says to political scientists about the more or less enduring nature and role of party identification. The data presented in Table 1, and my 
